ZIP idea: Privacy of Zcash against Quantum and Discrete-Log-Breaking Adversaries
ZIP idea proposes documenting Zcash's privacy properties against quantum and discrete-log-breaking adversaries, including current properties (dependent on not leaking addresses) and potential fixes.
Radar summary of the original source
An open proposal—not a live product.
Radar found activity on the original proposal source. Open means the source still lists it as open; it does not mean the proposal is approved, merged, or implemented.
- Status
- Open proposal
- Source
- Zcash Improvement Proposals
- Source activity
- Confidence
- Source-linked record
ZIPs
Zcash Improvement Proposals
Radar summary of the original source
Related activity
- Original source
[ZIP 312] Specify key generation, change randomizer handling
Changes to randomizer handling after I realized that it couldn't possibly be generated using the message as an input. It does simplify things too. Some additional fixes (using "Re-Randomized FROST" consistently; updating Owners) fixes #1051 Referenced issue #1051: [ZIP 312] Complete the specification for FROST key generation. This needs to be compatible with quantum resilience.
- Original source
NU7: ZIP 218 rounding lowers the supply cap that ZIP 237 claims to keep
Found by @str4d. ZIP 218 sets the post-NU7 subsidy to floor(MaxBlockSubsidy / (2·3·2^Halving)), so three 25-second blocks pay up to 2 zatoshi less than one 75-second block. ZIP 218 states the resulting shortfall from MAX_MONEY: 0.6720 + (H_3 − A)/10^8 ZEC, of which 0.1848 ZEC predates NU7. ZIP 237 reissues only the NSM Value Balance: pre-NU6 unclaimed value plus removed funds. The rounding loss never enters it, so Mainnet issuance converges to MAX_MONEY minus 67,200,000 + (4,406,400 − A) zatoshi, where A is the NU7 activation height.
- Original source
More NU7 ZIP fixes
Proposal 1403 is tracked from its source repository.